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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Despite the extensive spread of micro finance, studies on the actual impact of MFIs are 
often more ambivalent about its impact than is the aid community. Much has been written on the 
range of institutional arrangements pursued in different organizations and countries and in turn a vast 
number studies have attempted to assess the outreach and poverty impact of such schemes. However, 
amongst the academic development community there is a recognition that perhaps we know much 
less about the impact of these programs than might be expected given the enthusiasm for these 
activities in donor and policy-making circles. 
 
In recognition of this uncertainty this paper aims to bring together some of the recent 
evidence that has been accumulating on the impact of microfinance activities on poverty reduction. 
In particular we ask what is the evidence on three specific issues: 
 
– the extent to which microfinance initiatives have made a lasting difference in pulling 
households out of poverty on a permanent basis; 
– the extent to which microfinance programs reach only the better-off amongst the 
poor, leaving the ‘core poor’ unaffected; 
– how far micro finance is a cost-effective means of transferring income to the poor. 
 
The evidence surveyed here suggests that the conclusion from the early literature, that 
whilst micro finance clearly may have had positive impacts on poverty it is unlikely to be a simple 
panacea for reaching the core poor, remains valid. Reaching the core poor is difficult and some of 
the reasons that made them difficult to reach with conventional financial instruments mean that they 
may also be high risk and therefore unattractive microfinance clients. Hence there is a need to 
continually improve design and outreach and to see MFIs as part of the package for targeting the 
poor, rather than the whole solution. 
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Micro Finance and Poverty Reduction in Asia: What is the Evidence? 
John Weiss, Heather Montgomery and Elvira Kurmanalieva† 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The microfinance revolution has changed attitudes towards helping the poor in many 
countries and in some has provided substantial flows of credit, often to very low-income 
groups or households, who would normally be excluded by conventional financial 
institutions. Bangladesh is the starkest example of a very poor country, where currently 
roughly one quarter of rural households are direct beneficiaries of these programs 
(Khandker 2003). Much has been written on the rapnge of institutional arrangements 
pursued in different organizations and countries and in turn a vast number studies have 
attempted to assess the outreach and poverty impact of such schemes. However, 
amongst the academic development community there is a recognition that perhaps we 
know much less about the impact of these programs than might be expected given the 
enthusiasm for these activities in donor and policy-making circles. To quote a recent 
authoritative volume on micro finance: 
“MFI field operations have far surpassed the research capacity to analyze them, 
so excitement about the use of micro finance for poverty alleviation is not backed up 
with sound facts derived from rigorous research. Given the current state of knowledge, 
it is difficult to allocate confidently public resources to microfinance development.” 
(Zeller and Meyer 2002). 
This is a very strong statement of doubt and in part reflects a lack of accurate 
data, but also in part methodological difficulties associated with assessing exactly what 
proportion of income and other effects on the beneficiaries of micro credit can actually 
be attributed to the programs themselves. In recognition of this uncertainty this paper 
aims to bring together some of the recent evidence that has been accumulating on the 
impact of microfinance activities on poverty reduction. In particular we ask what is the 
evidence on three specific issues.   
 
− the extent to which microfinance initiatives have made a lasting difference in 
pulling households out of poverty on a permanent basis; 
− the extent to which microfinance programs reach only the better-off amongst the 
poor, leaving the ‘core poor’ unaffected; 
− how far micro finance is a cost-effective means of transferring income to the 
poor. 
 
                                                 
† John Weiss is Research Director and Heather Montgomery is a Research Fellow at the ADB Institute. 
At the time of writing Elvira Kurmanalieva was a Research Associate at the ADB Institute.  This first 
draft of this paper was presented at the 2003 ADB Institute Annual Conference on “Microfinance in Asia: 
Poverty Impact and Outreach to the Poor,” Tokyo, 5 December 2003. 
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These are very basic questions and the fact that they can still be posed reflects 
the extent of uncertainty in the literature. 
The paper is organized in four sections. The first provides a brief overview of 
some of the features of microfinance activities in Asia, which is our region of focus. 
The second discusses a few concepts from the poverty literature and links these with 
microfinance programs. The third surveys the evidence from recent research studies on 
the first two of the three questions posed above. The fourth section addresses the third 
question.  Since a number of other surveys are also available we give most attention to 
evidence produced in the last three or four years.1 Finally we draw some brief 
conclusions. 
2. Some Features of Micro Finance in Asia 
“Asia is the most developed continent in the world in terms of volume of MFI 
(microfinance institution) activities.”  This conclusion, drawn by Lapeneu and Zeller 
(2001:27), is based on an analysis of over 1,500 institutions from 85 developing 
countries.  Comparing MFIs in Asia with those in Africa and Latin America, the study 
found that in the 1990s Asia accounted for the majority of MFIs, retained the highest 
volume of savings and credit, and served more members than any other continent.   
This generalization of course covers up some wide disparities within the 
region.  East Asia is particularly well served by MFIs.  The largest number of members 
served and the largest distribution of loans and mobilization of savings in terms of GNP 
is found in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam.  In contrast, the two most 
populated countries in Asia, India and the PRC, have very low outreach, despite a high 
concentration of the regions poor.  Countries such as Afghanistan, Myanmar and 
Pakistan also have low outreach due to a variety of factors.   
Despite these disparities within the region, overall it is said that MFIs have 
flourished in Asia and that  compared to other regions they exhibit good outreach and 
high repayment rates.2  Table 1 below presents the most recent data from the 
Microbanking Bulletin, which gives only data on the limited number of MFIs who 
choose to report to the Bulletin. Those reporting to the Bulletin are thought to be 
amongst the best and are therefore unlikely to be representative (Meyer 2002: 14). 
Nonetheless amongst these, by various measures, Asian MFIs demonstrate relatively 
good outreach.  They account for the largest number of borrowers (70% of which are 
women) and are second only to African MFIs in terms of number of voluntary savers.  
In terms of impact, size of loans and deposits are often taken as a simple indicator of 
impact on the poor. By these criteria, Asian MFIs have among the lowest Loan and 
Savings Balance per Borrower, even after adjusting for GNP per capita, suggesting that 
they are effectively reaching the poor.   
 
                                                 
1 An earlier helpful survey published by ADBI is Meyer (2002). This draws out some of the 
methodological problems in assessing impact and surveys a number of important studies available at the 
time of the writing (around 2001). Morduch (1999) is an extremely authoritative earlier survey focusing 
on both conceptual and empirical questions. 
2 Lapenu and Zeller (2001:28) table 16. 
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Table 1. Outreach Indicators by Region 
Number of 
Active 
Borrowers 
Average Loan 
Balance per 
Borrower (US$) 
Number of 
Voluntary 
Savers 
Average Saving 
Balance per 
Saver (US$) 
Africa 21,974 228 27,082 105 
Asia 32,915 195 18,374 39 
Eastern Europe/ 
Central Asia 6,040 590 0 N/a 
Latin America 13,755 581 2,422 741 
Middle East/  
North Africa 13,463 286 0 N/a 
Source: Microbanking Bulletin Issue #9, July 2003 
 
 
The institutions that provide micro finance and the methods used to deliver 
microfinance products take a variety of forms—cooperatives, village banks, and lending 
to solidarity groups or individuals—and we see almost all of these varieties within Asia. 
As there can be a variety of lending approaches, a range of institutional models 
are also found for MFIs. These include unregulated NGOs, credit unions or co-
operatives (which are often regulated), registered banking institutions (either banks or 
non-bank financial institutions) and government organizations. In some cases the 
institutional forms blur into one another with government banks operating microfinance 
services in collaboration with NGOs or credit co-operatives. 
In recent years there has been a significant shift in both thinking and practice in 
the microfinance sector with MFIs coming to be seen as providing a range of financial 
services to the poor, including savings facilities, not just micro credit. The intellectual 
argument for this comes from the insight that the poor have a strong need to manage 
their very limited resources and that various forms of savings play an important role in 
household budgeting by the poor (Rutherford 2000). The practical demonstration of this 
is the shift from the original Grameen model of micro credit for productive purposes to 
Grameen Mark II with its emphasis on a range of flexible financial products, including 
loans of varying repayment periods for consumption as well as investment and various 
short and longer-term savings accounts (Rutherford 2003).  
In parallel with this reappraisal of micro finance within the NGO sector has 
gone a move towards the transformation of NGOs into regulated financial institutions 
with a view to allowing them to tap non-donor sources of funding and to offer a wider 
range of financial services. This trend, which has seen 39 important NGOs (15 in Asia) 
transformed over the period 1992-2003, places micro finance squarely within the 
conventional financial sector and raises important issues of governance and regulation 
in connection with the new institutions (Fernando 2003). Given that the failure of 
commercial financial institutions to reach the poor provided the initial impetus for 
MFIs, this new trend is paradoxical and raises questions as to whether the initial poverty 
reduction objectives of the transformed NGOs will be subjugated to commercial criteria 
(so-called ‘mission drift’), although Fernando (2003) argues that as yet there is little 
evidence of this. 
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3. Poverty and Micro Finance 
Here we define poverty as an income (or more broadly welfare) level below a socially 
acceptable minimum and micro finance as one of a range of innovative financial 
arrangements designed attract the poor as either borrowers or savers. In terms of 
understanding poverty a simple distinction can be drawn within the group ‘the poor’ 
between the long-term or ‘chronic poor’ and those who temporarily fall into poverty as 
a result of adverse shocks, the ‘transitory poor’. Within the chronic poor one can further 
distinguish between those who are either so physically or socially disadvantaged that 
without welfare support they will always remain in poverty (the ‘destitute’) and the 
larger group who are poor because of their lack of assets and opportunities. Furthermore 
within the non-destitute category one may distinguish by the depth of poverty (how far 
households are below the poverty line) with those significantly below it representing the 
‘core poor’, who are sometimes categorized by the irregularity of their income.  
In principle, micro finance can relate to the chronic (non-destitute) poor and to 
the transitory poor in different ways. The condition of poverty has been interpreted 
conventionally as a lack of access by poor households to the assets necessary for a 
higher standard of income or welfare, whether assets are thought of as human (access to 
education), natural (access to land), physical (access to infrastructure), social (access to 
networks of obligations) or financial (access to credit) (World Bank 2000:34).  Lack of 
access to credit is readily understandable in terms of the absence of collateral that the 
poor can offer conventional financial institutions, in addition to the various complexities 
and high costs involved in dealing with large numbers of small, often illiterate, 
borrowers. The poor thus have to rely on loans from either moneylenders, at high 
interest rates, or friends and family, whose supply of funds will be limited. 
Microfinance institutions attempt to overcome these barriers through innovative 
measures such as group lending and regular savings schemes, as well as the 
establishment of close links between poor clients and staff of the institutions concerned. 
As noted above, the range of possible relationships and the mechanisms employed are 
very wide.  
The case for micro finance as a mechanism for poverty reduction is simple. If 
access to credit can be improved, it is argued, the poor can finance productive activities 
that will allow income growth, provided there are no other binding constraints. This is a 
route out of poverty for the non-destitute chronic poor. For the transitory poor, who are 
vulnerable to fluctuations in income that can bring them close to or below the poverty 
line, micro finance provides the possibility of credit at times of need and in some 
schemes the opportunity of regular savings by a household itself can be drawn on. The 
avoidance of sharp declines in family expenditures by drawing on such credit or savings 
allows ‘consumption smoothing.’ In practice the distinction between the needs of the 
chronic and transitory poor for credit for ‘promotional’ (that is income creating) and 
‘protectional’ (consumption smoothing) purposes, respectively, is over-simplified, since 
the chronic poor will also have short term needs that have to be met, whether it is due to 
income shortfalls or unexpected expenditures like medical bills or social events like 
weddings or funerals. In fact, it is one of the most interesting generalizations to emerge 
from the micro finance and poverty literature that the poorest of the chronic poor (the 
core poor) will borrow essentially for protectional purposes given both the low and 
irregular nature of their income. This group it is suggested will be too risk averse to 
 5
borrow for promotional measures (that is investment in the future) and will therefore be 
only a very limited beneficiary of microfinance schemes (Hulme and Mosley 1996: 
132).3  
The view that it is the less badly-off poor, who benefit principally from micro 
finance, has become highly influential and, for example, was repeated in the World 
Development Report on poverty  (World Bank 2000:75). Apart from the risk aversion 
argument noted above a number of other explanations for this outcome have been put 
forward. A related issue refers to the interest rates charged to poor borrowers. Most 
microfinance schemes charge close to market-clearing interest rates (although these will 
often not be enough to ensure full cost-recovery given the high cost per loan of small-
scale lending).  It may be that, even setting aside risk-aversion argument, such high 
rates are unaffordable to the core poor given their lack of complementary inputs; in 
other words, despite having a smaller amount of capital, marginal returns to the core 
poor may be lower than for the better-off poor. If the core poor cannot afford high 
interest rates they will either not take up the service or take it up and get into financial 
difficulties. Also where group lending is used, other members of the group may exclude 
the very poor because they are seen as a bad credit risk, jeopardizing the position of the 
group as a whole. Alternatively, where professional staff operate as loan officers, they 
may exclude the very poor from borrowing, again on grounds of repayment risk. In 
combination, these factors, it is felt by many, explain the weakness of micro finance in 
reaching the core poor.4 
Even where micro finance does reach the core poor, when (as in many 
instances) donor or government funds are required to subsidize the microfinance 
institutions involved, it is not inevitably the case that this is an efficient strategy. As 
funds are fungible within households, the use of the loan is not the issue and what 
matters is the cost of transferring the funds through a micro credit institution per dollar 
received by the target group, as compared with the benefit-cost ratio for alternative 
schemes for reaching the core poor, such as food subsidies, workfare, integrated 
regional development initiatives and so forth. Such comparisons must take account of 
not just the administrative costs involved, but also the leakage rate (that is the benefits 
to the non-poor).    
Given the new trends in the sector and their possible effect in diluting the 
original poverty focus of MFIs the question of their impact on the poor (and particularly 
the core poor) is clearly of great policy interest. It might be thought that if such 
institutions are designed to serve only poor clients and if repayment rates are high, no 
further detailed analysis is needed. Such a view is misleading for a number of reasons. 
First, there is no guarantee that only the poor will be served unless strong eligibility 
                                                 
3 Morduch (2003) points out that, although this argument may be true, the data in Hulme and Mosley’s 
book cannot be used to infer this since the arithmetic basis for their comparison of income changes for 
different categories of borrowers, biasing their results in favor of their conclusion.  
4 An important attempt to address this problem has been the Income Generation for Vulnerable Group 
Development (IGVGD) program run by BRAC in Bangladesh, which combines measures of livelihood 
protection (food aid) with measures of livelihood promotion (skills training and micro credit). Hence, 
micro credit is provided as part of a package approach. Matin and Hulme (2003) survey the evidence on 
how far the benefits of this program actually reach the core poor and conclude that although the program 
was more successful than more conventional micro credit schemes, nonetheless many target households 
were still missed.  
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criteria (like land ownership) are enforced. Often the aim is to dissuade the non-poor 
with the inconvenience of frequent meetings or the stigma of being a member of a credit 
group of the poor. Such disincentives need not work and eligibility criteria where they 
exist may not be enforced. Second, high repayment rates may be due to social pressure 
within a group or family and may not reflect the capacity to repay (if for example loans 
from moneylenders have to be taken out to repay the micro credit). Third, even if the 
poor are genuinely served by MFIs, as long a public funds are required to finance the 
MFI there is the issue of how cost-effective this means of reaching the poor is compared 
with alternatives. Hence for these sorts of reasons, there is a strong case for attempting 
to assess the impact of such loans on the welfare of the target group.  
Nonetheless assessing the true relationship between microfinance services and 
poverty reduction is not straightforward. It is not simply a case of looking at a group of 
borrowers, observing their income change after they took out micro credits and 
establishing who has risen above the poverty line. Accurate assessment requires a 
rigorous test of the counterfactual—that is how income (or whatever measure is used) 
with a micro credit compares with what it would be without it, with the only difference 
in both cases being the availability of credit. Empirically, this requires a control group 
identical in characteristics to the recipients of credit and engaged in the same productive 
activities, who have not received credit, and whose income (or other measure) can be 
traced through time to compare with that of the credit recipients.5 Furthermore, to allow 
for changes over time, in principle assessments should allow for the possibility of 
reversals, with households slipping back below the poverty line if the productive 
activities financed by the credits are unsustainable. Studies based on a rigorous 
counterfactual find much smaller gains from micro finance than simple unadjusted 
‘before and after’ type comparisons, which erroneously attribute all gains to micro 
credit.  
Here we examine some of the recent ‘scientific’ studies on the impact of MFIs 
based on various survey data. We do not report the results of work based on more 
qualitative or participatory approaches.6 Table 2 summarizes the results of the studies 
surveyed here. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Coleman (2001) has a useful non-technical explanation of the difficulties of applying this approach and 
eliminating ‘selection’ and ‘placement’ bias in micro credit studies. 
6 See Hulme (1999) for a discussion of different approaches to impact. He points out that despite their 
cost in funds and time, such scientific studies involving detailed sample surveys are the most common 
approach where the aim is to establish impact for policy or investment purposes.  
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Table 2.  Microfinance Impact Studies 
Study Coverage  (in Asia only) Methodology Results 
Hulme and 
Mosley (1996) 
Indonesia (BKK, 
KURK, BRI), India 
(Regional Rural 
Banks) Bangladesh  
(Grameen, BRAC, 
TRDEP), Sri Lanka 
(PTCCS) 
Borrowers and control 
samples, before and 
after. 
Growth of incomes of 
borrowers always 
exceeds that of control 
group. Increase in 
borrowers income larger 
for better-off borrowers. 
MkNelly et al.  
(1996) 
Thailand (village 
banks - Credit with 
Education) 
Non-participants in 
non-program villages 
used as controls 
Positive benefits, but no 
statistical tests for 
differences reported. 
Khandker (1998) Bangladesh (Grameen, BRAC) 
Double difference 
comparison between 
eligible and ineligible 
households and 
between program and 
non-program villages 
5% of participant 
households removed 
from poverty annually. 
Additional consumption 
of 18 taka for every 100 
taka of loan taken out by 
women. 
Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) 
Bangladesh 
(BRAC, BRDB, 
Grameen Bank) 
Double difference 
estimation between 
eligible and non-
eligible households 
and programs with and 
without microfinance 
programs. Estimations 
conducted separately 
for male and female 
borrowing. 
Positive impact of 
program participation on 
total weekly expenditure 
per capita, women’s 
nonland assets and 
women’s labor supply.  
Strong effect of female 
participation in 
Grameen Bank on 
schooling of girls. 
Credit programs can 
change village attitudes 
and other village 
characteristics. 
Coleman (1999) Thailand  (village banks)  
Double difference 
comparison between 
participant and non-
participant households 
and between villages 
in which program is 
introduced and 
villages where it is not 
yet introduced. 
No evidence of program 
impact. Village bank 
membership has no 
impact on asset or 
income variables.  
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Study Coverage  (in Asia only) Methodology Results 
Chen and 
Snodgrass (2001) India (SEWA bank) 
Control group from 
same geographic area. 
Average income 
increase rises for bank’s 
clients in comparison 
with control group. 
Little overall change in 
incidence of poverty, but 
substantial movement 
above and below 
poverty line.  
Coleman (2004) Thailand  (village banks) 
Double difference 
estimation between 
participants and non-
participants and 
villages with and 
without microfinance 
program. 
Programs do not reach 
the poor as much as they 
reach relatively wealthy 
people. Impact is larger 
on richer committee 
members than on rank-
and-file members. 
Park and Ren 
(2001) 
PRC  
(NGOs, 
government 
programs, mixed 
NGO-government 
programs)  
(i) Probit estimation of 
participation and 
eligibility for each 
type of program; (ii) 
OLS and IV estimation 
of impact of micro 
credit on household 
income. 
In NGO and mixed 
programs the very rich 
even if eligible (for 
mixed programs) are 
excluded from 
participation. In the 
government program the 
rich are both eligible 
and more likely to 
participate. Impact 
estimation finds 
evidence of positive 
impact of micro credit 
on income. 
Duong and 
Izumida (2002) 
Viet Nam  
(VBA 84% of total 
lending), VBP, 
PCFs, commercial 
banks, public 
funds)  
Tobit estimation of (i) 
participation in rural 
credit market; (ii) 
behavior of lender 
toward credit-
constrained household 
and (iii) weighted least 
square estimation for 
impact on output 
supply.  
The poor have 
difficulties in accessing 
credit facilities: 
livestock and farming 
land are determinants of 
household participation; 
reputation and amount 
of credit applied for to 
MFI are determinants of 
credit rationing by 
lenders. Impact 
estimation shows 
positive correlation 
between credit and 
output. 
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Study Coverage  (in Asia only) Methodology Results 
Kaboski and 
Townsend (2002) 
Thailand 
(production credit 
groups, rice banks, 
women groups, 
buffalo banks) 
Two-staged LS and 
MLE test of 
microfinance impact 
on asset growth, 
probability of 
reduction in 
consumption in bad 
years, probability of 
becoming 
moneylender, 
probability of starting 
business and 
probability of 
changing job. Separate 
estimation according 
to type of MFI and 
policies of MFI. 
Production credit groups 
and women groups 
combined with training 
and savings have 
positive impact on asset 
growth, although rice 
banks and buffalo banks 
have negative impacts. 
Emergency services, 
training and savings 
help to smooth 
responses to income 
shock. Women groups 
help reduce reliance on 
moneylenders. 
Amin et al. (2003) 
Bangladesh 
(Grameen Bank, 
BRAC, ASA) 
1) Nonparametric test 
of stochastic 
dominance of average 
monthly consumption 
of members and 
nonmembers. 
2) Maximum 
likelihood test of 
micro credit 
membership on 
vulnerability, 
consumption and 
household 
characteristics.   
Members are poorer 
than nonmembers. 
Programs are more 
successful at reaching 
poor, but less successful 
at reaching vulnerable. 
Poor vulnerable are 
effectively excluded 
from membership. 
Gertler et al. 
(2003) 
Indonesia  
(Bank Rakyat 
Indonesia, Bank 
Kredit Desa, 
commercial banks) 
1) Basic consumption-
smoothing test on 
household’s ability to 
perform daily living 
activities (ADL Index). 
2) State dependence 
tests of basic 
regression (relative 
man-woman earning, 
physical job, savings). 
2) Test of geographical 
proximity to financial 
institutions on 
consumption 
smoothing. 
Significantly positive 
correlation between 
household’s 
consumption and 
measure of health. 
Wealthier households 
are better insured 
against illness. 
Households that live far 
from financial 
institutions suffer more 
from sudden reductions 
in consumption.  
Study Coverage  (in Asia only) Methodology Results 
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Khandker (2003) 
Bangladesh 
(Grameen bank, 
BRAC, BRDB) 
1) Fixed effect Tobit 
estimation of 
borrowing dependent 
on land education 
endowments of 
households.  
2) Panel data fixed 
effects IV estimation 
to define long-term 
impact of micro 
finance borrowing on 
expenditure, non-land 
assets and poverty 
(moderate and 
extreme). 
Households who are 
poor in landholding and 
formal education tend to 
participate more  
Micro finance helps to 
reduce extreme poverty 
much more than 
moderate poverty (18 
percentage points as 
compared with 8.5 
percentage points over 7 
years). Welfare impact is 
also positive for all 
households, including 
non-participants, as 
there are spillover 
effects.  
Pitt et al. (2003) 
Bangladesh 
(BRAC, BRDB, 
Grameen Bank) 
Maximum likelihood 
estimation controlling 
for endogeneity of 
individual 
participation and of the 
placement of 
microfinance 
programs. Impact 
variables are health of 
boys and girls (arm 
circumference, body 
mass index and height-
for-age) 
Significantly positive 
effect of female credit 
on height-for-age and 
arm circumference of 
both boys and girls. 
Borrowing by men has 
either negative or non-
significant impact on 
health of children. 
4. Poverty Impact  
One of the early and most widely cited of the poverty impact studies is Hulme and 
Mosley (1996). This employed a control group approach looking at the changes in 
income for households in villages with microfinance programs and changes for similar 
households in non-program areas. Programs in a number of countries are considered 
including the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). In 
general a positive impact is found on borrower incomes of the poor (1988-92) with on 
average an increase over the control groups ranging from 10-12% in Indonesia, to 
around 30% in Bangladesh and India  (Hulme and Mosley 1996, table 8.1). Gains are 
larger for non-poor borrowers, however, and within the group the poor gains are 
negatively correlated with income. However, despite the breadth of the study and its use 
of control group techniques, it has been criticized for a possible ‘placement’ bias, 
whereby microfinance programs may be drawn to better placed villages, so that part of 
the advantage relative to the control group may be due to this more favorable location. 
Further, the quality and accuracy of some of the data, particularly in relation to the 
representative nature of the control groups, has been questioned (Morduch 1999:1600). 
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Another major early initiative that has provided some of the firmest empirical 
work were the surveys conducted in the 1990s by the Bangladesh Institute of 
Development Studies (BIDS) and the World Bank; these provided the data for several 
major analyses, such as Pitt and Khandker (1998).  Khandker (1998) summarizes a 
number of different studies conducted in Bangladesh using the 1991/92 survey and 
focusing on three major microfinance programs, including the Grameen Bank and the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC). Methodologically impact is 
assessed using a double-difference approach between eligible and ineligible households 
(with land holdings of more than half an acre making households ineligible) and 
between program and non-program villages. After controlling for other factors, such as 
various household characteristics, any remaining difference was attributed to the 
microfinance programs. The study draws a number of conclusions, but the main one is 
that the program had a positive effect on household consumption, which was 
significantly greater for female borrowers. On average, a loan of 100 taka to a female 
borrower, after it is repaid, allows a net consumption increases of 18 taka. In terms of 
poverty impact it is estimated that 5% of participant households are pulled above the 
poverty line annually.  
Khandker (2003) follows up this earlier work by employing panel data. He 
uses the BIDSWorld Bank survey conducted in 1998-99 that traced the same 
households from the 1991-92 survey.7  He finds apparently strong and positive results. 
Whilst borrowing by males appears to have no significant impact on consumption, that 
by females, who are the dominant client group, does have a positive impact. From this 
analysis a 100 taka loan to a female client leads to a 10.5 taka increase in consumption 
(compared with 18 taka in the earlier analysis). Allowing for the impact of higher 
consumption on poverty gives estimates of poverty impact. It is estimated that due to 
participation in microfinance programs moderate poverty among program participants 
decreased 8.5 percentage points over the period of seven years and extreme poverty 
dropped about 18 points over the same period.8 He also finds evidence of positive 
spillovers on non-program participants in the villages with the impact greater for those 
in extreme poverty. Poverty for non-participants is found to decline by 1 percentage 
point due to the programs whilst extreme poverty declines by nearly 5 percentage 
points. This impact is due solely to female borrowing. 
The same data set has also been used to identify health impacts as opposed to 
income changes. Pitt et al. (2003) find that credit going to females has a large and 
significant impact in two out of three health measures for children. Male borrowing has 
no such effect. For example, a 10% increase in credit to females increases the arm 
circumference of daughters by 6.3%, the height of girls by 0.36 cm annually and of boys 
by 0.50 cms. The relations are stronger for daughters than sons. Hence in Bangladesh, 
micro credit and improved family health appear to be related. 
These are strong and positive results and probably are the clearest evidence 
there is that micro finance is working in the way intended to bring sustained relief from 
                                                 
7 Technically the study is rigorous in employing a two stage instrumental variable approach along with a 
household fixed-effects method to control for possible endogeneity bias, particularly for the fixed 
unobserved characteristics of households (that is the more entrepreneurial amongst the poor are those who 
borrow and these may do better anyway).   
8 Poverty is based on a daily calorie intake of 2,112 and extreme poverty on one of 1,739. 
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poverty. However a couple of caveats are in order. First, the accuracy of the original 
results as presented in Pitt and Khandker (1998) has been disputed on the grounds that 
the eligibility criteria of low land holdings was not enforced strictly in practice. In a 
reworking of the results focusing on what are claimed to be more directly comparable 
households, no impact on consumption from participation in a program is found 
(Morduch 1999:1605).9 Second, in the BIDs-World Bank survey data, the ‘ultra poor’ 
(defined as those with less than 0.2 acres of land) form nearly 60% of participants and 
the likelihood of participation is strongly and negatively associated with level of land 
holding. Nonetheless, how much is borrowed depends principally on the 
entrepreneurship of households, so that the charge that the risk-averse very poor will 
benefit less has not been totally dispelled. Furthermore, the panel data reveal a relatively 
high dropout rate of around 30%, indicating that there were problems for many 
households. 
There are examples of many other studies that are either inconclusive or 
provide less convincing results. Coleman (1999) and MkNelly et al. (1996) both focus 
on experiences with village banking in Thailand. Coleman (1999) utilizes data on 
villages that had participated in village bank microfinance schemes and those control 
villages that were designated as participants, but had not yet participated. This allows a 
double difference approach that compares the difference between income for 
participants and non-participants in program villages with the same difference in the 
control villages, where the programs were introduced later. From the results here, the 
poverty impact of the schemes appears highly dubious. Months of village bank 
membership have no impact on any asset or income variables and there is no evidence 
that village bank loans were directed to productive purposes. The small sizes of loans 
mean that they were largely used for consumption, but one of the reasons there is a 
weak poverty impact is that there was a tendency for wealthier households to self-select 
into village banks. 
Coleman (2004) uses the same survey data but reconsiders the estimation 
strategy to control for self-selection. He argues that the village bank methodology, 
which relies on self-selection by loan size and monitoring by frequent meetings, may 
not reach the poorest. As many wealthy households tend to be on village bank 
committees, the failure to control for this leads to systematic biases. The regression 
results of Coleman (2004) indicate that there is a substantial difference between 
ordinary members and committee members of village banks. The impact of micro 
credits on ordinary members’ well being is either insignificantly different from zero or 
negative. On the contrary, the impact of microfinance programs on committee members’ 
measures of wealth, such as income, savings, productive expenses and labor time is 
positive, implying a form of program capture by the better-off in the village, even 
though this group may not be well-off by national standards. A similar result in terms of 
rationing micro credit in favor of better-off groups or members is found by Doung and 
Izumida (2002) in a study of six villages in Viet Nam. There whilst credit availability is 
linked with production and income, household economic position and prestige in a 
                                                 
9 This debate, which in part centers around details of econometric estimation, has not been resolved. An 
unpublished paper by Pitt reworks the original analysis to address the concerns of Morduch and is said to 
confirm the original results (Khandker 2003, footnote 1). 
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village plus the amount of credit applied for are the main determinants of how credit is 
allocated. 
MkNelly et al. (1996) evaluated the Freedom from Hunger credit with 
education program in Thailand operated through village banks. The results show 
positive benefits, however, although non-participants in non-program villages are used 
as controls, there are problems in accepting the results. No statistical tests are reported, 
so one cannot judge whether differences between participants and non-participants are 
significant.  There is also a potential measurement bias since the staff responsible for 
the program also did the interviewing. 
Chen and Snodgrass (2001) examine the operations of the Self Employed 
Women’s Association (SEWA) bank in India, which provides low-income female 
clients in the informal sector with both saving and loan services. The study tests for the 
impact of these services by comparing the bank’s clients against a randomly selected 
control group in a similar geographic area. Two surveys were conducted two years 
apart. Average incomes rose over time for all groups—borrowers, savers and the 
control—although the increase was less for the latter. In terms of poverty incidence 
there was little overall change, although there was substantial ‘churning’, in that 
amongst the clients of SEWA there was quite a lot of movement above or below the 
poverty line. In interpreting these results Meyer (2002) argues that the evidence on the 
counterfactual, that is what would have happened to the clients in the absence of the 
services of SEWA, is not sufficiently strongly established to draw any firm conclusions 
on poverty impact. 
The smoothing of consumption over time to protect the poor against adverse 
shocks is one of the principle objectives of micro credit. Using data again for 
Bangladesh, Amin et al. (2003) compute several measures of vulnerability.10 They find 
that the micro credit participants in the two villages covered are more likely to be below 
the poverty line than if they had been selected at random, so that the programs have 
reached the poor. However, the vulnerable are more likely to join a micro credit 
program in only one of the two villages. Further, for the vulnerable below the poverty 
line in one village, there is no evidence that there are more likely to be members of a 
program, and in the other village there is evidence that they have either chosen not to 
join or are actively excluded, presumably on the grounds that they are a poor credit risk. 
Hence the very poor and vulnerable do not appear to be reached.  
More positive conclusions in terms of the ability of micro finance to reduce 
vulnerability are found for Indonesia by Gertler et al. (2003), who find that access to 
micro finance helps households to smooth consumption in the face of declines in health 
of adult family members. Having established an empirical relationship between health 
condition and consumption, the authors test for a relation between access to a financial 
institution and consumption shortfalls associated with ill health. Using geographic 
distance as a measure of access, they find that for households in an area with a BRI 
                                                 
10 Unlike the Khandker studies this data picks up households before they joined a micro credit scheme. 
Their vulnerability measure is broader than simply fluctuations in consumption. 
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branch, health shocks have no effect on consumption.11  This study does not differentiate 
within the group of the poor. 
5. Forms of Micro Credit Interventions and Cost-effectiveness 
Experimentation and local variation are likely to be important aspects of successful 
MFIs. A few studies have looked in detail at the impact and cost effectiveness of 
different forms of intervention. For example, Park and Ren (2001) look at the Chinese 
experience drawing on household survey data for 1997. They are able to compare three 
types of programs based on ownership characteristics—NGO-based, mixed programs 
and government ownership. Whether in terms of conventional financial criteria like 
repayment rates, or measures of initial impact like targeting effectiveness, the NGO 
programs appear to function best, with the government-run programs the least 
successful. 
Detailed mechanisms for micro lending are examined for Thailand by Kaboski 
and Townsend (2003), who look at different institutional variants such as production 
credit groups, women’s groups, rice banks and buffalo banks, as well as a variety of 
services included training and various savings facilities. Of the forms of institutions, 
allowing for a range of other factors, the women’s groups appear to have the largest 
positive impact on their members. Of the services offered, training in conjunction with 
credit appears to work well and the availability of savings facilities appears to be 
associated with asset growth amongst households. Of the savings services, regular 
‘pledged savings’ have the largest positive impact. Explanations offered for this include 
the use of savings as collateral for further loans either from the institution itself or from 
other sources, and a reduction in the cost and risk of infrequent deposits and 
withdrawals. However since the poorest may not be in a position of offer regular 
savings this also provides an explanation for why they may benefit relatively less from 
MFIs.12  
Most studies of the impact of different forms of micro finance do not conduct a 
full cost effectiveness analysis in order to judge both the effectiveness of different 
alternatives and how microfinance interventions compare in efficiency terms with other 
ways of reaching the poor. However, there is often a general expectation that MFIs are 
an effective and efficient means of reaching the poor. For example, Wright (2000) 
argues that “...micro finance has a particular advantage over almost (and probably) all 
other interventions” in providing cost-effective and sustainable services to the poor.  
The early work by Khandker (1998) attempts to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
micro credit in Bangladesh (that is costs per taka of consumption for the poor) as 
compared with more formal financial institutions and other poverty-targeted 
interventions. His data are summarized in Table 3. They appear to be based on the 
assumption of a zero leakage rate to the non-poor. The interesting result that emerges is 
that the Grameen Bank is considerably more effective than BRAC and that, as expected, 
loans to female borrowers are considerably more cost-effective than loans to males. 
                                                 
11 Patten et al (2001) find evidence that the micro finance side of the Indonesian banking system 
performed much more robustly during the macro crises of the late 1990s than did the commercial banking 
sector. 
12 Fujita (2000) makes this point in the context of Bangladesh. 
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Further, subsidies to Grameen (but not to BRAC) appear to be a more cost effective 
means of reaching the poor than various ‘food for work’ programs. However, a ‘food 
for education’ scheme appeared to be very cost effective relative to the ‘food for work’ 
programs and to BRAC.13  Formal financial institutions are less cost-effective than 
Grameen for both female and male borrowers and less cost effective than BRAC in 
some, but not all, cases examined (Khandker 1998:134-139). The high figure for BRAC 
is in part due to the range of services, such as training, offered in addition it micro credit 
(see footnote 4), but nonetheless if such services are essential to the success of micro 
credit, including their cost in a cost-benefit assessment of micro credit is legitimate. 
It is interesting to note that Khandker does not conclude from this that all 
subsidies to other poverty interventions should be withdrawn and reallocated to micro 
finance. Rather he points out that as participants to micro credit borrowing self-select 
(that is they judge that micro credit suits their particular needs, often for self employed 
work) others amongst the poor may not be able to benefit. For this latter group other 
forms of targeting will still be required.  
 
Table 3. Cost Effectiveness Ratiosa): Bangladesh in the early 1990s 
Intervention Female Male All borrowers 
Grameen Bank  0.91 1.48  
BRAC 3.53 2.59  
Agricultural 
Development Bank 
(BKB)b) 
  4.88 
Agricultural 
Development Bank 
(RAKUB)c) 
  3.26 
Vulnerable Group 
Development   1.54 
Food for Work 
(CARE)d)   2.62 
Food for Work (World 
Food programme)   1.71 
Food for Educatione)   0.94 (1.79) 
Source: Khandker (1998) Tables 7.2 and 7.3 and Wodon (1998) 
Notes: a) Ratio of costs to income gains to the poor 
b) Bangladesh Krishi Bank 
c) Rajshahi Krishi Unnayan Bank   
d) Run by CARA on behalf of USAID 
e) Source for this data is Wodon (1998); figure in brackets is the cost effectiveness ratio for 
the very poor. 
 
 
The above data provide ambiguous support for the idea that micro finance is a 
cost-effective means of generating income for the poor. The figures for Grameen 
support this view, whilst those for BRAC do not. More recently a couple of other 
                                                 
13 The study on this scheme by Wodon (1998) appears considerably more sophisticated than the other 
studies and compares costs with the future stream of estimated benefits to the poor in terms of gains from 
education. The ratio for this activity may not be directly comparable with the other figures in the table. 
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estimates have become available. Burgess and Pande (2003) examine whether the 
pattern of commercial bank expansion in India into rural areas, previously not served by 
banks, has had an impact on rural poverty and their work allows a simple comparison 
with micro finance. Their estimates suggest that it costs 2.72 rupees to generate an 
additional rupee of income for the poor via social banking programs. Compared with the 
data in Table 3 this ratio is higher than the cost-effectiveness ratio for Grameen, but 
lower than that for BRAC.14  
A further look at the effectiveness of Grameen is provided by Schreiner (2003), 
who calculates the subsidy-lending ratio at 0.22 over the period 1983-97. This is not 
directly equivalent to the ratios in Table 3, but assuming the same return to borrowing 
as in Khandker (1998) these figures can be converted into a broadly equivalent ratio of 
cost to gains to the poor of 1.15. This is consistent with the figures in Table 3, which 
would need to be averaged to give an overall return to male and female borrowing 
combined. The result confirms Grameen as a relatively cost-effective form of poverty 
intervention, although it says nothing about how the benefits from its activities are 
distributed between the poor, the very poor and those above the poverty line. 
6. Conclusions 
Despite the extensive spread of micro finance, research studies on the actual impact of 
MFIs are often more ambivalent about its impact than is the aid community. In part this 
reflects the methodological problems of establishing appropriate statistical controls and 
in part no doubt also the range of variation found in practice in the way in which micro 
finance operates.  Our view is that, despite the difficulties, more good poverty impact 
studies are important to sharpen understanding of its role as an anti-poverty tool, to 
assess its impact in different environments and to shape the debate on ways forward for 
MFIs. 
Amongst practitioners there is widespread acceptance of the view that it is both 
necessary to diversify the products of micro finance and adapt them to local 
circumstances. Any simple replication of formulae successful elsewhere is rightly 
treated with suspicion. However the evidence surveyed here suggests that the 
conclusion from the early literature, that whilst micro finance clearly may have had 
positive impacts on poverty it is unlikely to be a simple panacea for reaching the core 
poor, remains broadly valid. Reaching the core poor is difficult and some of the reasons 
that made them difficult to reach with conventional financial instruments mean that they 
may also be high risk and therefore unattractive microfinance clients. 
There has been an extensive debate, which we do not touch on here, on the 
financial sustainability of MFIs. We would simply make the point that just because an 
institution needs a subsidy to cover its costs in itself is not a reason for not supporting 
the institution. The issue should be, what benefits in terms of income gains for the poor 
can be achieved with the subsidy and how does the ratio of subsidy to benefits compare 
with that for other interventions. Detailed cost effectiveness studies are rare and those 
that are available show both high and low scores for MFIs in the same country. Hence 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that the benefits from Grameen lending found in Khandker (2003), which are almost 
half of those found in his earlier study, imply considerably higher cost effectiveness ratios to those 
reported in Table 3, unless there has been a corresponding rise in the efficiency of operations. 
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there is a need to continually improve design and outreach and to see MFIs as part of 
the package for targeting the poor, rather than the whole solution.  
Our view is that despite the difficulties, poverty impact studies of MFIs can 
provide important information and that continued efforts should be made to sharpen 
understanding of the impacts of different forms of MFI activity on the poor, including 
their cost-effectiveness. 
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